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Abstract
It is increasingly recognised within public health scholarship that policy change depends on the nature of the 
power relations surrounding and embedded within decision-making spaces. It is only through sustained shifts in 
power in all its forms (visible, hidden and invisible) that previously excluded perspectives have influence in policy 
decisions. Further, consideration of the underlying neoliberal paradigm is essential for understanding how existing 
power dynamics and relations have emerged and are sustained. In their analysis of political and governance factors, 
Townsend et al have provided critical insight into future potential strategies for increasing attention to health 
concerns in trade policy. In this commentary we explore how incorporating theories of power more rigorously into 
similar political analyses, as well as more explicit critical consideration of the neoliberal political paradigm, can assist 
in analysing if and how strategies can effectively challenge existing power relations in ways that are necessary for 
transformative policy change. 
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Understanding the political and governance conditions that enable or constrain attention to non-communicable disease (NCD)-related health 
issues in trade policy is critical to making progress towards 
institutionalizing public health impact analysis into trade 
policy-making. Townsend and colleagues’1 comparative 
analysis of NCD-related issues in Australia during the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations makes a significant 
contribution in this area, offering insight into the process, 
and a number of potential strategies to increase attention to 
health in future trade policy in Australia. However, there is 
considerable scope for this research, like the vast majority 
of health policy process and governance research, to  engage 
more explicitly with concepts and analysis of power.  It is 
increasingly recognised within public health scholarship that 
policy change depends on the nature of the power relations 
surrounding and embedded within decision-making spaces 
and only through sustained shifts in power can previously 
excluded perspectives have influence in policy decisions.2 
We suggest, therefore, that adopting theories of power from 
the social sciences would enable clearer identification and 
visibility of different forms of power and their mechanisms 
to identify strategies for driving transformative change. 
Secondly, the analysis of Townsend et al elides critical 
discussion of the underlying dominant political ideology that 
both underlies and is maintained by the power dynamics and 
relations in political and public spaces.  As such, the analysis 
and suggested strategies for promoting greater prioritization 
of health in trade policy risk being confined within the 
dominant market-oriented, pro-capitalist neoliberal model. 
With this comes a missed opportunity to imagine and 
articulate the transformative structural change necessary to re-
orientate power relations such that significant and sustainable 
prioritization of health in trade policy can be realised.
Like Shiffman and Smith,3 Townsend et al conceptualise 
power as being held by actors, defining it as the ‘strength of 
the individuals and organisations concerned with the issue, 
including the cohesiveness of advocacy groups, presence of 
strong leaders, supportive institutions and strong civil society 
mobilisation.’ We suggest this definition excludes important 
structural (hidden) and discursive (invisible) forms of power. 
It is also somewhat unclear in describing the mechanisms of 
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power (ie, how it actually operates). Finally, it fails to indicate 
the impact of power in terms of policy action or inaction. 
Various useful theories and frameworks of power have been 
developed by social and political science scholars2,4,5 and more 
recently public health academics.6 While each has specific 
strengths, we explore here Gavanta’s Power Cube as one 
example of a useful analytical tool for understanding policy 
processes and subsequent policy action or inaction, including, 
we argue, how and why health issues are not prioritized on 
trade policy agendas. Further, such frameworks have the 
potential to help public health policy scholars, practitioners 
and advocates identify and evaluate if and how different 
strategies for change in turn change the power relations that 
currently hold health issues outside the concerns of trade 
policy-makers.2 They can also provide a tool for coordinating 
complementary actions to challenge power across different 
spaces (open, closed, invited and claimed) and levels 
(international, national and sub-national) to more effectively 
and sustainably transform power relations.2
Building on Lukes’ three dimensions of power,5 Gavanta 
outlines three key forms of power. Visible power refers to 
observable influence over decision-making and includes the 
visible and definable aspects of political power – formal 
rules, procedures and authorities of decision-making. For 
example, most governments do not have formal structures 
for meaningful involvement of public health actors or civil 
society in trade policy development while corporate actors 
generally do, contributing to their significant influence over 
trade policy decisions. Hidden power refers to controlling the 
political agenda and involves the processes by which certain 
powerful people and institutions take advantage of economic 
structures and institutional practices to limit who is included 
in decision-making spaces, whose interests are valued and the 
scope of alternatives for consideration.4 For example, as was 
identified by Townsend et al, alcohol exporting countries tend 
to neglect alcohol-related public health concerns in the trade 
domain. 
Invisible power is about shaping interpretation and 
perceptions of what is acceptable.2 It the most insidious and 
pervasive form of power and tends to be most commonly 
neglected in health policy and governance research. Invisible 
power involves shaping the ‘psychological and ideational 
boundaries’ of participation with significant problems and 
potential solutions held outside the consciousness of the actors 
involved, including those directly affected by the problem.2 
This is achieved through mechanisms of socialisation, 
including the transfer of culture and ideas, that promote 
the perception of issues in one way rather than another, 
ultimately defining what solutions are normal, acceptable and 
safe.2 As such, policy actors can be prevented from elevating 
solutions in their own real interest5. For example, NCDs are 
widely understood as problems of ‘individual responsibility’ 
and demand for risk commodities including alcohol and 
ultra-processed foods (UPF) a matter of choice, not a supply 
problem facilitated by trade liberalization. As such, nutrition 
and alcohol-related harm are often not perceived as issues to 
be considered within trade policy.7-9 While actors can have 
agency over invisible power, it can also operate at the system 
level. Over time the norm of prioritizing economic interests 
over food and alcohol-related health issues in trade policy-
making have become entrenched and public health strategies 
that interfere with ‘free’ and open markets are considered 
radical.
Neoliberalism can be defined as a policy paradigm focused 
on reshaping the regulatory environment in favour of free 
market principles as the most effective means of achieving 
economic growth and public welfare.10,11 Rushton and Williams 
describe neoliberalism as the ‘deep core’ of the contemporary 
global political economy providing an overarching logic, set of 
assumptions and values operating across policy domains. As 
such they consider neoliberalism to have profoundly affected 
the configuration of global health policy-making power and 
authority.12 We hold a similar perspective and argue therefore 
that power relations and dynamics in trade and health policy-
making should explicitly be considered within the context of 
neoliberalism, although specificity, nuance and reflexivity are 
critical to understanding neoliberalism’s varied manifestations 
in different political and cultural contexts and for not 
over-stating its impacts.13 Townsend et al do note in their 
introduction that framings used in trade policy discourse that 
align with a ‘dominant neoliberal market-oriented discourse’ 
promotes the privileging of UPF and alcohol companies’ 
export interests over NCD prevention concerns. They also 
report in their findings that only framings of access to generic 
medicines aligned with neoliberal ideas were advanced by 
trade actors. However, a deeper interrogation of how any 
of the other various ‘political and governance conditions’ 
identified in the analysis have themselves been shaped by and 
generate power relations and dynamics under the neoliberal 
policy paradigm would be valuable. 
For example, neoliberalism has facilitated the profitability 
and global expansion of UPF and alcohol corporations and 
advertising/marketing agencies.14 This has given UPF and 
alcohol corporations the capacity to undertake intensive 
and sophisticated marketing campaigns embedding their 
products in different cultures through shifting cultural norms 
around consumption of their products15; and to use various 
strategies to amplify framing of NCDs that resonate with 
neoliberal values of freedom and individual choice.16 Via these 
mechanisms corporations capture invisible power influencing 
the way the public, political parties and trade policy-makers 
perceive NCDs and the appropriate policy responses as largely 
limited to individual-level harm reduction interventions. 
Corporations are also able to take advantage of hidden power 
under neoliberalism. Given governments’ reliance on private 
industry profit to achieve the narrow economic growth 
objective, profitable corporations enjoy close relationships 
with and access to trade policy-makers and the trade policy 
agenda is largely shaped by their interests, as was identified 
by Townsend et al. Most directly, neoliberal logic has shaped 
the existing international trade and investment agreement 
context that provides corporations with legal grounds and 
means to threaten or pursue legal challenges against NCD 
policy. While this may be a relatively effective mechanism of 
visible power, as Townsend et al found, trade or investment-
related litigation can also generate greater attention to NCD 
Milsom et al 
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–4 3
issues in trade policy spaces.
While the researchers make important recommendations 
for promoting greater prioritisation of health in trade policy, 
without incorporating explicit and comprehensive analysis 
of power and paradigms, their analysis tends to remain for 
the most part constrained within the existing structures 
of neoliberalism and the associated power structure. For 
example, they propose mandatory health impact assessments 
of proposed trade texts and further studies to collect the 
evidence on the causal connections between NCD risk 
products and trade deals. While these are important 
considerations, we also know that instrumental power alone, 
for example using public health knowledge and evidence to 
encourage policy action, is alone usually insufficient to drive 
public policy change. For evidence to drive policy action 
is must also generally be confluent with current political 
discourse and ideological conditions.17
The authors also call for greater trade literacy amongst the 
health community, including health policy-makers, as well as 
institutional changes that ensure participation of these health 
actors in trade negotiation processes. But participation does 
not necessarily translate into sharing power, including hidden 
(agenda-setting) power. For example, after pressure during the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, the US government 
proposed establishing a Public Interest Trade Advisory 
Committee to input into negotiations. However, Public 
Interest Trade Advisory Committee members would be bound 
by nondisclosure agreements, restricting their engagement 
with the wider civil society movement and be located in less 
influential groups than industry representatives.18 In Thailand, 
despite improving health policy-maker’s trade literacy and 
increasing public health actor participation in trade policy 
spaces, it is not clear that these changes actually influenced 
Thailand’s trade negotiating positions.19 We suggest that these 
examples indicate that without transforming the overarching 
policy paradigm, the existing dynamics of hidden power in 
trade policy spaces are simply reproduced, albeit more subtly, 
within new institutional arrangements. 
Finally, we strongly agree that the potential wide-ranging 
impacts of trade agreements on the social determinants of 
health, including environment, employment, human rights 
and social sectors, provides critical opportunities for a 
broader coalition of public interest actors. But what strategies 
can these public interest actors use to effectively challenge 
existing power relations and how much can they achieve 
under the existing paradigmatic constraining goals and 
values? We suggest such a coalition may be most effective 
in advancing shared interests in trade policy if it coalesced 
around an alternative paradigm with new values and goals. A 
paradigm that, for example, is designed to reshape rather than 
grow the economy and aims to meet the health and social 
needs of the population within the means of the planet.20,21 
A broad coalition of public interest actors could then, for 
example, begin to claim back some invisible power by 
disseminating framings that resonate with their new shared 
ideology, expanding the ideational boundaries around how 
issues are interpreted and future possibilities for addressing 
them. For example, decoupling the neoliberal association of 
free markets with free choice, and communicating a more 
nuanced understanding of the complex structural and social 
forces interacting to regulate behaviour can expand the 
boundaries around conceivable policy options to include 
those that would genuinely support informed choices and 
create environments in which health products are affordable 
and accessible.20
We acknowledge though that driving paradigmatic change 
is an enormously challenging undertaking, especially for less 
powerful actors. Theories proposed by some scholars indicate 
that relatively smaller-scale strategies, like many suggested 
Townsend et al, can generate cumulative healthy adjustments 
to and additional health protective measures within trade 
policy which eventually can lead to the necessary broader 
paradigmatic transformation.22 However, we would again 
caution that if such strategies do not effectively challenge all 
existing forms of power that maintain current trade policy-
making norms where trade is often prioritized over health, 
they are unlikely to lead to transformative change. 
Through their analysis of political and governance 
factors, Townsend et al have provided critical insight into 
future potential strategies for increasing attention to health 
concerns in trade policy. We propose future research builds 
on this and other similar political analyses to adopt a more in-
depth conceptualization and analysis of power with explicit 
critical reflection of the paradigmatic context shaping the 
power relations between trade, public health and corporate 
actors. Using such an approach may facilitate the discovery 
and development of potential strategies to tackle the deep 
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